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THE IMPACT OF FLOODPLAIN STUDIES 
AND FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT 
ON PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
by Carol E. Dinkins 
INTRODUCTION 
As the federal government uses its floodplain maps to implement 
floodplain land-use regulations, private interests are arming themselves 
with their own engineering studies to argue with the government about 
whether or not all Texas lands are subject to floods from rivers, floods from 
hurricanes, or floods from just rainfall. Because floodplain identification 
significantly affects property values, lawyers will be appealing the engi- 
neers' floodplain identifications. If the lawyers lose on those appeals, they 
may sue on the basis that map drawing by engineers for local community 
use in regulating construction and development constitutes a denial of pri- 
vate property rights. 
EFFECTS OF FLOODPLAIN IDENTIFICATION 
Floodplain mapping has had a considerable impact on local develop- 
ment. One of the most expensive results has been delay. As interest and car- 
rying costs mount, landowners have waited t o  learn whether or not they 
could develop large tracts of land that were purchased just prior to the origi- 
nal National Flood Insurance Program of 1968.' If a property owner under- 
took development or construction within a floodplain located in a commu- 
nity that participated in the program, the construction was subject to fed- 
eral land-use requirements implemented a t  the local level. Many landowners 
had acquired large tracts, expecting to  begin development as soon as engi- 
neering and land-use plans had been completed. Then, on the last day of 
1973, Congress and the President made the Flood Insurance Program man- 
datory; no federally regulated or insured financial aid was available for con- 
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struction in the 100-year floodplain unless the borrower purchased federally 
subsidized flood insurance on the  structure^.^ This in turn invoked the re- 
quirement that construction and development proceed only in accordance 
with federal land-use regulations enforced at the local level.' 
The floodplain concept is new and has had unsettling effects on prop- 
erty owners who can no longer realize their original expectations. Many 
owners had acquired lands that they believed were not flood-prone, only to 
learn quickly that their property was considered flood-prone under the 
stringent federal standard, the 100-year flood (also called the 1%-chance 
flood). 
Having made this discovery, landowners assessed the construction 
costs necessary to  develop designated floodplain land and found two or 
three basic  alternative^.^ Property owners in fringe floodplain areas could 
bring their land above the level of the 100-year flood with area-wide fill. By 
seeking and receiving a letter of map amendment from the Federal Insur- 
ance Administration, they could then have the property removed from 
flood-prone designations. Other landowners with large tracts could request 
state approval for stream rectification or  perimeter Ievee construction to  
protect their property. Again, a map amendment would be required. The 
most common means of floodplain construction, of course, is to raise the 
slabs of individual structures or to elevate them by pier and beam construc- 
tion. Nonresidential structures can be flood proofed and still comply with 
the program. A final category of landowners includes those who discovered 
that their property lay within a designated floodway area. These people are 
the most seriously affected, since they cannot develop or construct on their 
property unless they are able to show that flood heights will not increase as 
a result of their encroachment into the floodway. 
UNPREDICTABILITY OF IDENTIFICATION 
Because identification of flood-prone land carries with it restrictive 
land-use requirements, many landowners sought to determine in advance 
what the 100-year floodplain would look like if mapped in accordance with 
FIA criteria. Other landowners, whose property was designated as subject 
to flood hazards, retained consultants who try to convince the FIA that its 
studies are inapplicable to their property. Either course of action requires 
that the consultant be thoroughly familiar with the FIA criteria for approv- 
ing or disapproving the 100-year floodplain. A wide range of disagreements 
has appeared with regard to particular floodplain decisions. 
To meet legal requirements, precise identification, nor subjective deci- 
sions, must be used. Such elements as the development of a regional or sta- 
tion skew coefficient, the orientation of cross-sections across a floodplain, 
and the calculation of bounded frequency discharge curves using a standard 
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project or probable maximum flood5 are necessary for resolving disputes 
between clients and government agencies. When the FIA mapped the 100- 
year floodplain in the Houston area, it was necessary to learn how the 
Corps of Engineers used FIA criteria in developing hydrology and hy- 
draulics studies. Floodplain mapping uncertainties and the resulting land- 
use restrictions affect water resources management and floodplain informa- 
tion development. These uncertainties must be considered with respect to 
administrative appeal of floodplain decisions and, in particular, the judicial 
remedies available for a property owner forbidden to use his land as he 
wishes. 
APPEAL 
The two-level mapping procedure used by the Federal Insurance Ad- 
ministration triggers two different approaches to reviewing administrative 
action. The initial map, the Flood Hazard Boundary Map, can be appealed 
at the administrative level by a request, accompanied by technical data, for 
a letter of map amendment. Grounds for appeal include better topographic 
information, notice that the property has been filled, o r  a new floodplain 
study showing that the FIA hydrology or hydraulics study was done incor- 
rectly. The second set of maps, the rate maps, is also subject to technical ap- 
peal, which is a much more formal administrative process, starting at the 
local level. 
If appeals fail, the property owner can seek redress through the federal 
courts under the provisions of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.7 
Such an appeal would be based upon determining whether there is substan- 
tial evidence to support the Federal Insurance Administration's conclu- 
sions. Research has not revealed any appeal that has been prosecuted 
through the courts attacking the flood mapping conclusions of the FIA, but 
a court can be expected to examine the reasonableness of the FIA evalua- 
tion. 
THE "TAKING" ISSUE 
Exploration of all possible avenues of resolution at the administrative 
level is strongly recommended because the present case law, although it 
offers some comfort, does not indicate much certainty of relief. Most cases 
involving taking of land because of floodplain regulations arise in the state 
courts. Since these types of regulatory programs are imposed on a local 
level, rather than a federal level, the suits customarily have not been 
brought against the federal government. There are no Texas cases on flood- 
plain zoning. 
Land-use regulation is constitutionally limited. The fifth and four- 
teenth amendments to the United States Constitution and similar provisions 
in state constitutions forbid the taking of property without compensation. 
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The government can exercise its police power to further public safety, 
heaith, and welfare by restricting land uses, but it cannot restrict them so 
far as to deprive the owner of the beneficial use of his land. When the owner 
is deprived of all reasonable uses, the regulation is deemed t o  be confisca- 
tory and in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 
If a court decides a governmental action results in an unconstitutional 
taking of land, two types of relief are possible. The court may declare the 
statute invalid as applied t o  a particular tract of land, or the court may 
order the government to buy the tract in question under an inverse condem- 
nation theory. In an inverse condemnation cause of action, the property 
owner institutes a suit for reimbursement, claiming that the government has 
in essence taken the land under its eminent domain power, and therefore 
must reimburse the owner for its value in accord with the fifth amendment. 
Case law indicates that a court may be limited by the circumstances of a par- 
ticular case in granting a particular type of relief. In some cases the court 
may not compel reimbursement under an inverse condemnation theory un- 
less the governmental agency involved in the suit has the power of eminent 
d ~ m a i n . ~  
Regulations cannot be enacted for the purpose of preserving land for 
the general public. In order to maintain private land in a natural state, the 
government must show that public interests are harmed by planned private 
use. This can be done by proving that proposed development would en- 
danger the lives or property of others. In this way the regulations can be- 
come an exercise of police power. 
In floodplain zoning cases, in particular, courts will uphoId restrictions 
that reduce the value of lands, but they generally invalidate restrictions that 
deny all economic uses of lands. To find an economic use, courts may con- 
sider whether or not the lands are capable of earning a fair rate of return 
based upon the original price, the cost of improvements where development 
cannot be achieved in a natural state, and the taxes on the land. Normally, 
however, denial of a use is held not to be unreasonable when the land use 
may be hazardous to the landowner, occupants of his land, or purchasers. 
The courts are more likely to uphold the restriction if the regulation does 
not render an entire parcel ~ n u s a b l e . ~  There has been no recent litigation, 
and none ever in Texas, on these issues. A court might strike down those 
floodplain regulations that deny use of private property on the Texas coast, 
because the coast, lacking canyons and valleys, does not experience the sud- 
den high velocity floods that gravely endanger lives and property in other 
parts of the country. Hurricanes are certainly a threat, however, especially 
in lower-lying areas. 
Few of the reported cases appear to consider any detailed or sophisti- 
cated hydrologic studies, but where presented, such technical information 
has benefited those plaintiffs injured by the floodplain regulations. 
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There is little in common among the ten or twelve individual cases on 
floodplains and taking of land. Several state courts have ruled specific 
floodplain regulations unconstitutional with regard to particular tracts; 
those floodplain regulations had permitted only uses that were not readily 
available to a private landowner for obtaining an economic return on his 
property. 
One of the notable cases involving floodplain regulations is Morris 
County Land Improvement Co. v. Zoning Board of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 
193 A.2d 232 (N.J, Sup. Ct. 1963). The New Jersey Supreme Court found 
that the zoning regulations were adopted for a public benefit-the preserva- 
tion of open space as well as flood control in the lower reaches of the valley. 
Its ruling stated that the uses that might be permitted to the landowner were 
public or quasi-public in nature, and not such uses as would be readily avail- 
able to the ordinary private landowner as a means of obtaining a return on 
the property. Although the measures adopted by Parsippany-Troy Town- 
ship did not amount to a direct or outright taking, the town indirectly took 
the land through excessive regulation under the police power. When strict 
regulations prevent a private owner from exercising reasonable rights to his 
land, the court prefers public acquisition to regulation because inverse con- 
demnation is at work. 
Similar conclusions were drawn in Dooley v. Town Plan & Zon. Com'n 
of Town of Fairfield, 197 A.2d 770 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Errors 1964). The Con- 
necticut court found that zoning regulations rendered use of the plaintiff s 
land impossible, which act, in effect, amounted to a practical confiscation 
of the land. The court held that exercise of eminent domain was a more ap- 
propriate action than regulation, since the public, but not the property own- 
er, benefited directly from avoidance of floodplain development. 
Another Connecticut court held that denying an owner permission to 
build the particular kind of structure he wanted was not an unconstitutional 
deprivation of a right to use property if the owner was permitted to build a 
different type of structure suited to the same use."' 
Two cases involving wetlands zoning are of interest because the same 
general principles apply to floodplain zoning. In Bartlett v. Zoning Corn- 
mission of the Town of Old Lyme, 282 A.2d 907 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 197 I), the 
court studied whether the purpose of preserving marshlands from encroach- 
ment or destruction could be accomplished through zoning regulations. Cit- 
ing Dooley, noted above, the court found that practical uses of the plain- 
tiff's property were almost nonexistent. The court held that, in this particu- 
lar complaint, the zoning regulation amendments were unreasonable, con- 
fiscatory, and unconstitutional. 
In MacCibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 255 N.E.2d 347 
(Mass. Sup. 5. Ct. 1970), the court held that preservation of privately 
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owned land in an unspoiled state for public enjoyment and benefit by pre- 
venting the owner from having any practical uses is not within the scope of 
any power delegated to the municipalities under the State Zoning Act. The 
town might lawfully accomplish its purpose only by acquiring the wetlands 
through gift, purchase, or eminent domain. 
In Sturdy Homes, Inc. v. Township of Redford, 186 N.W.2d 43 (Mich. 
App. 1971), the court held that the floodplain ordinance was not unconsti- 
tutional per se, but as applied to this plaintiff, it unreasonably deprived him 
of any use of his property. Similar to this classic case, which found that 
application of the zoning ordinance to  the particular property amounted to 
expropriation, was A. H. Smith Sand & Gravel Company v. Department of 
Water Resources, 313 A.2d 820 (Md. Ct. App. 1974). Again, the attack was 
not upon the validity of the legislation, but upon the application of the gen- 
eral statutory plan to the particular situation. Because the plaintiff had not 
yet applied for a variance permit, the court could not determine whether 
there had been a taking of land. The court, however, set forth the proper 
criteria for determining the floodplain. In determining the limits of the 50- 
year flood, an agency must establish floodplain encroachment limit lines 
based on existing, not future, conditions. 
There are also cases that uphold the constitutionality of the statutes as 
well as the application of floodplain regulations, such as Turnpike Realty 
Company v. Town of Dedhum, 284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. Sup. J. Ct. 1972). 
The court noted that floodplain zoning protects those who develop or 
occupy the land in spite of the dangers, as well as other people in the com- 
munity, by alleviation of their damages from flooding. In contrast with 
cases discussed above, the court found the plaintiff had not been deprived 
of all beneficial use of the property although it was "substantially restrict- 
ed" in use of the land. 
In Turner v. County of Del Nor~e,  101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1st Dt. Ct. 
App. 1972), the court upheld floodplain zoning and showed clearly the 
need for such zoning. The plaintiffs in that case sued the county for inverse 
condemnation of their property, which was platted as a residential subdivi- 
sion. The area had been flooded four times in a thirty-seven year period. 
During a 1964 flood, the main channel of the river flowed directly across the 
property in question, sweeping everything away and destroying an entire 
town four miles downstream from the subdivision. The court found evi- 
dence of a flooding frequency that would "almost certainly eventually de- 
stroy" permanent structures built on this land as well as endanger the lives 
and health of the occupants. The court also found that buildings in this 
floodplain would increase flood heights, increasing the hazard to other 
buildings downstream. 
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FLOOD CONTROL AND LIABILITY 
IN TEXAS FLOODPLAlN CASES 
Another legal issue in floodplain designation is liability for damages 
resulting from alteration of a floodplain. When stream rectification, or 
channelization, and construction of levees are the means of alteration, the 
Texas Department of Water Resources exercises regulatory jurisdiction, 
The department must give prior approval t o  the construction and mainte- 
nance of "any levee or other such improvement on, along, or near any 
stream" that would control, regulate, or change the floodwater of the 
stream (Section 16.238 of the Texas Water Code). 
Texas courts have repeatedly observed that no  one rule can govern 
cases concerning the placement of levees o r  embankments along streams. 
The facts of each situation must be weighed t o  determine the rights of the 
parties." The act, however, of causing water to leave a stream channel, 
including a flood channel, and inundate lands not previously flooded con- 
stitutes a direct trespass to such land, A landowner has no right to  commit 
such an act without being held responsible at law for damage to the realty. 
While a property owner is generally held liable under Texas Water 
Code Section 11.086 for actions injuring neighboring land, the consulting 
engineer is not liable under the statute, according to a recent Texas Supreme 
Court ruling. In Kraft v. Langford, 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.  302 (April 5, 1978), 
the court held that the engineer for a development was immune from suit 
for liability under the Water Code provision that prohibits damage of prop- 
erty of others by diverting surface waters. The engineer, however, who has 
been to the Texas Supreme Court twice in the past few years, may find his 
way back there on the same case because the court refused to  rule that he 
was not liable under some common law theory or cause of action. The court 
also ruled that status as a professional engineer did not protect the defend- 
ant from either remedy as a matter of law. 
SUMMARY 
In concluding this nutshell course in floodplain law, I can make a 
number of suggestions. The property rights of landowners must be consid- 
ered when evaluating flood hazards. In floodplain identification for any 
governmental agency, the concluding studies must comply with applicable 
guidelines and criteria to  assure that floodplain management restrictions 
apply equally to  everyone, for the resulting conclusions have tremendous ef- 
fects on personal property rights. Standard, accepted means of calculating 
and defining the floodplain area should be used since more subjective meas- 
ures have not been endorsed by the courts. Predictions and future problems 
will have to be dealt with as policy questions, as the courts look at present 
conditions in reaching their decisions. 
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Representatives of private interests who suffer from floodplain iden- 
tification should be inquisitive about the criteria used in mapping. If the re- 
sults appear inapplicable or inappropriate, they should raise questions and 
suggest alternative methods. If this fails, they could consider whether the 
issue is critical enough and clear enough to ensure that their clients may pre- 
vail in the courthouse, where remedies are few. 
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